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preface1 introductionpart ¢¡ theory of the consumer2 preferences and utility¡¡2.1 introduction¡¡2.2 the consumer's preference relation¡¡2.3 the marginal rate of substitution¡¡2.4 the consumer's utility function¡¡2.5 utility functions and the marginal rate of substitution¡¡2.6 a solved problem¡¡exercises appendix. differentiation of functions3 the budget constraint and the consumer's optimal choice¡¡3.1 introduction¡¡3.2 the standard budget constraint, the budget set, and the budget line¡¡3.3 shifts of the budget line¡¡3.4 odd budget constraints¡¡3.5 income and consumption over time¡¡3.6 the consumer's optimal choice: graphical analysis¡¡3.7 the consumer's optimal choice: utility maximization subject to the budget constraint¡¡3.8 two solved problems¡¡exercises¡¡appendix. maximization subject to a constraint: the lagrange function method4 demand functions¡¡4.1 introduction¡¡4.2 demand as a function of income¡¡4.3 demand as a function of price¡¡4.4 demand as a function of price of the other good¡¡4.5 substitution and income effects¡¡4.6 the compensated demand curve¡¡4.7 elasticity¡¡4.8 the market demand curve¡¡4.9 a solved problem¡¡exercises5 supply functions for labor and savings¡¡5.1 introduction to the supply of labor¡¡5.2 choice between consumption and leisure¡¡5.3 substitution and income effects in labor supply¡¡5.4 other types of budget constraints¡¡5.5 taxing the consumer's wages¡¡5.6 saving and borrowing: the intertemporal choice of consumption¡¡5.7 the supply of savings¡¡5.8 a solved problem¡¡exercises6 welfare economics 1: the one-person case¡¡6.1 introduction¡¡6.2 welfare comparison of a per-unit tax and an equivalent lump-sum tax¡¡6.3 rebating a per-unit tax¡¡6.4 measuring a change in welfare for one person¡¡6.5 measuring welfare for many people; a preliminary example¡¡6.6 a solved problem¡¡exercises appendix. revealed preference7 welfare economics 2: the many-person case¡¡7.1 introduction¡¡7.2 quasilinear preferences¡¡7.3 consumer's surplus¡¡7.4 a consumer's surplus example with quasilinear preferences¡¡7.5 consumers' surplus¡¡7.6 a last word on the quasilinearity assumption¡¡7.7 a solved problem¡¡exercisespart ¢¢ theory of the producer8 theory of the firm 1: the single-input model¡¡8.1 introduction¡¡8.2 the competitive firm's problem, focusing on its output¡¡8.3 the competitive firm's problem, focusing on its input¡¡8.4 multiple outputs¡¡8.5 a solved problem¡¡exercises9 theory of the firm 2: the long-run, multiple-input model¡¡9.1 introduction¡¡9.2 the production function in the long run¡¡9.3 cost minimization in the long run¡¡9.4 profit maximization in the long run¡¡9.5 a solved problem¡¡exercises10 theory of the firm 3: the short-run, multiple-input model¡¡10.1 introduction¡¡10.2 the production function in the short run¡¡10.3 cost minimization in the short run¡¡10.4 profit maximization in the short run¡¡10.5 a solved problem¡¡exercisespart ¢£ partial equilibrium analysis: market structure11 perfectly competitive markets¡¡11.1 introduction¡¡11.2 perfect competition¡¡11.3 market/industry supply¡¡11.4 equilibrium in a competitive market¡¡11.5 competitive equilibrium and social surplus maximization¡¡11.6 the deadweight loss of a per-unit tax¡¡11.7 a solved problem¡¡exercises12 monopoly and monopolistic competition¡¡12.1 introduction¡¡12.2 the classical solution to monopoly¡¡12.3 deadweight loss from monopoly: comparing monopoly and competition¡¡12.4 price discrimination¡¡12.5 monopolistic competition¡¡12.6 a solved problem¡¡exercises13 duopoly¡¡13.1 introduction¡¡13.2 cournot competition¡¡13.3 more on dynamics¡¡13.4 collusion¡¡13.5 stackelberg competition¡¡13.6 bertrand competition¡¡13.7 a solved problem¡¡exercises14 game theory¡¡14.1 introduction¡¡14.2 the prisoners' dilemma, and the idea of dominant strategy equilibrium¡¡14.3 prisoners' dilemma complications: experimental evidence and repeated games¡¡14.4 the battle of the sexes, and the idea of nash equilibrium¡¡14.5 battle of the sexes complications: multiple or no nash equilibria, and mixed strategies¡¡14.6 the expanded battle of the sexes, when more choices make players worse off¡¡14.7 sequential move games¡¡14.8 threats¡¡14.9 a solved problem¡¡exercisespart iv general equilibrium analysis15 an exchange economy¡¡15.1 introduction¡¡15.2 an economy with two consumers and two goods¡¡15.3 pareto efficiency¡¡15.4 competitive or walrasian equilibrium¡¡15.5 the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics¡¡15.6 a solved problem¡¡exercises16 a production economy¡¡16.1 introduction¡¡16.2 a robinson crusoe production economy¡¡16.3 pareto efficiency¡¡16.4 walrasian or competitive equilibrium¡¡16.5 when there are two goods, bread and rum¡¡16.6 the two welfare theorems revisited¡¡16.7 a solved problem¡¡exercisespart v market failure17 externalities¡¡17.1 introduction¡¡17.2 examples of externalities¡¡17.3 the oil refiner and the fish farm¡¡17.4 classical solutions to the externality problem: pigou and coase¡¡17.5 modern solutions for the externality problem: markets¡¡for pollution rights¡¡17.6 modern solutions for the externality problem: cap and trade¡¡17.7 a solved problem¡¡exercises18 public goods¡¡18.1 introduction¡¡18.2 examples of public goods¡¡18.3 a simple model of an economy with a public good¡¡18.4 the samuelson optimality condition¡¡18.5 the free rider problem and voluntary contribution¡¡mechanisms¡¡18.6 how to get efficiency in economies with public goods¡¡18.7 a solved problem¡¡exercises19 uncertainty and expected utility¡¡19.1 introduction and examples¡¡19.2 von neumann-morgenstern expected utility: preliminaries¡¡19.3 von neumann-morgenstern expected utility:¡¡assumptions and conclusion¡¡19.4 von neumann-morgenstern expected utility: examples¡¡19.5 a solved problem¡¡exercises20 uncertainty and asymmetric information¡¡20.1 introduction¡¡20.2 when sellers know more than buyers: the market for "lemons"¡¡20.3 when buyers know more than sellers: a market for health insurance¡¡20.4 when insurance encourages risk taking: moral hazard¡¡20.5 the principal-agent problem¡¡20.6 what should be done about market failures caused by asymmetric information¡¡20.7 a solved problem¡¡exercisesindex